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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE COALITION OF
SENIOR CITIZENS, et al.
*

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
*

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

*

Case No. 20152

Defendant/Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is an

action

to

recover

attorneys'

fees

for

consumer participation in a case before the Utah Public Service
Commission, pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA) 16 U.S.C. §§2631, 2632.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The

Third

District

Court

for

Salt

Lake

County,

Honorable David B. Dee presiding, granted Defendant's Motion for
Summary

Judgment

Judgment.

and

denied

Plaintiffs'

Motion

for

Summary

DISPOSITION SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 26, 1979, Plaintiffs and others submitted a
Petition to the Utah Public Service Commission (PSC) (Case No.
79-999-02)

requesting

terminations

of

a

utility

prohibition
service

on

during

all

winter

involuntary
months

and

requesting rulemaking proceedings to establish rules regarding
winter termination of utility service by all utilities under the
jurisdiction of the PSC.

(R. 2,3,7 and Transcript before the

Public Service Commission (hereafter Tr.) at 4-8). On December
17, 18 and 19, 1979, hearings were held and evidence presented on
this matter (Tr. 1-503 passim).
On January
Interim
relief
Service

Order

17, 1980, the PSC issued its Report and

denying

Plaintiff's

certain modifications
Regulations

(R. 72-79) .

(URUSR)

Petition

but

awarding

as

to the Utah Residential Utility
sought by

Plaintiffs' witnesses.

By the terms of this Order, the parties met and

attempted to resolve differences regarding permanent changes to
URUSR.

The PSC considered these proposals and on April 18, 1980,

issued a draft of proposed rules for incorporating the Interim
Order.

Further hearings were held to consider these proposed

rules on April 21, August 13, and August 25, 1980.

(Tr. Aug. 13,

1980, p. 1-151; Aug. 25, 1980, p. 152-254).
On February 19, 1981, the PSC issued its Order Adopting
Regulations, including many of the revisions to URUSR proposed by
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ARGUMENT
I.

A
CIVIL
ACTION
FOR
INTERVENOR
COMPENSATION IS AUTHORIZED UNDER PURPA
WHEN THE STATE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED AN
"ALTERNATIVE MEANS" WHICH SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENTS OF PURPA AND THE STATE
UTILITY COMMISSION DOES NOT MAKE DIRECT
AWARDS TO CONSUMER INTERVENORS.
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-J •} • r :ai... ;n . such a s
congress

e s t a b l i s h e d in

PURPA

to

reimburse

reasonable

costs

proceedings.

eligible

of

their

consumer

intervenors

participation

in

for

state

the
PURPA

Here Plaintiffs were such intervenors in just such

a PURPA proceeding.

The three procedures

are:

(1) direct

awards made by the utility commission which are paid by the
electric utility, §2632 (a) (2) (B);

(2)

a civil action against

the utility brought by an eligible intervenor in the appropriate
state court, §2632(a)(2);

or (3) a state-sponsored "alternative

means" program which assures representation of consumers and
provides intervenor compensation to eligible consumers to assure
their

participation

in

PURPA-related

proceedings,

§2632 (b).

Although PURPA does not mandate which of the three mechanisms the
state

must

adopt,

state-sponsored

it

does

"alternative

specify
means"

that

the

program

absence
triggers

of

a

the

obligation that eligible intervenors must be compensated through
either

civil

awards

or

direct

awards.

Utah

has

no

such

alternative means.
PURPA1s intervenor compensation options are set out as
follows:

16 U.S.C. §2632
Consumer Representation
(a) - Compensation for Costs of
Participation or Intervention
(1)

If no alternative means for assuring
representation of electric consumers is
adopted in accordance with Subsection
(b) and if an electric consumer of an
electric
utility
substantially
contributed to the approval, in whole or
in part, of a position advocated by such

- 4 -

consumer in a proceeding concerning such
utility, and relating to any standard
set forth in Subtitle B, such utility
shall be liable to compensate such
consumer (pursuant to paragraph (2)) for
reasonable
attorneys1
fees,
expert
witness fees, and other reasonable costs
incurred in preparation and advocacy of
such
position
in
such
proceeding
(including fees and costs of obtaining
judicial review of any determination
made in such proceeding with respect to
such position).
(2) A consumer entitled to fees and costs
under paragraph (1) may collect such
fees and costs from an electric utility
by bringing a civil action in any State
court of competent jurisdiction, unless
the State regulatory authority,..has
adopted a reasonable procedure pursuant
to which such authority...
A.

Determines the amount of such fees
and costs, and

B.

Includes an award of such fees and
costs
in
its
order
in
tEe
proceeding.

(b) Alternative Means - Compensation shall
not be required under Subsection (a) if
the State, [or] the State regulatory
authority...has provided an alternative
means
for
providing
adequate
compensation to persons (1) Who have, or represent, an interest
A.

which would
not otherwise be
adequately
represented
in
the
proceeding,....

(Emphasis added)
Congress provided that each state through its utility
commission could select the most suitable option from these three
choices.

If the state or state utility commission establishes an

"alternative

means"

program

(option

- 5 -

1) ,

the

state

assumes

responsibility to administer and provide a source of funds for
intervenor

compensation.

The

state

utility

commission,

by

awarding intervenor compensation in a PURPA case (option 2) ; or
by deferring to the Act's civil award provision

(option 3) ,

effectively chooses to pass the costs of PURPA intervenor funding
on to the individual electric utilities in the state.
The civil action procedure

is appropriate where no

state "alternative means" exists and/or the commission does not
make direct awards either as a policy choice or due to limited
statutory authority.
The simple test for determining if the state-sponsored
"alternative means"
§2632 (a) and

program satisfies the requirements of both

(b) is to determine whether

the

state program

provides compensation and assures the adequate representation of
consumers whose interests would otherwise not be represented.
Not surprisingly, most states which have adopted a PURPA
intervenor

compensation

procedure

have

decided

that existing

state-provided consumer representation did not fulfill the Act's
"alternative means" requirements and have chosen not to establish
new PURPA-based "alternative means" programs at state expense.
Instead, they
consumer

have established

that the reasonable

costs of

intervention must be paid by the utilities through

direct awards.

See

California, Re Costs of Participation in Elect]

Ratemaking Proceedings, 37 PUR 4th 259 (1980); Maine, Re Costs of
Participation in Comm'n.

Proceedings on PURPA, 37 PUR 4th 280

(1980); Alaska, In Re Procedure for Compensation of Electric

- 6 -

Consumers, 38 PUR 4th 127 (1980).

South Dakota, Kansas, West

Virginia and Minnesota have established similar procedures.
The Michigan Public Service Commission identified no
applicable "alternative means" program within the state.

But

unlike most states, Michigan does not make direct awards in its
rate orders.

Instead, the Commission explicitly

stated that

eligible intervenors must bring a civil action in court against
the utility as provided in §2632 (a)(1).

Proceedings to Consider

Electric Ratemaking Standards, 35 PUR 4th 339, 343 (Mich. P.S.C.
1980).

(The Utah Public Service Commission recently directed

such an action in another case involving Utah Power.
The Michigan Commission

acknowledged

that

See Ex. 1).

it could adopt an

alternative means procedure and it considered the Act's direct
award procedure, but concluded that it had no statutory authority
under

state

proceeding.

law

to

Courts

award
in

expenses

Idaho

and

in

Montana

an

administrative

have

also

denied

commission authority to award fees and required court action.

See

Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 639 P.2d
442 (Idaho 1981), and Montana-Dakota Utilities Company v. Montana
Dept. of Public Service Regulation, 50 PUR 4th 481 (Mont. Dist.
Ct. 1982).
Since it is undisputed that Utah does not make direct
awards, only if an "alternative means" exists can Utah Power
avoid payment.

- 7 -

II.

UTAH HAS NO "ALTERNATIVE MEANS" PROGRAM;
THEREFORE A CIVIL ACTION IS AVAILABLE TO
CONSUMER INTERVENORS

An "alternative means" program which complies with the
requirements of 16 U.S.C. §2632 (a) and

(b) precludes a civil

action for intervenor compensation.
Of PURPA's three intervenor compensation procedures,
the

state-sponsored

"alternative means"

difficult to neatly define.

program

is the most

This is in part because Congress

left much of the design of such programs to the states.

Unlike

the easily conceptualized civil action and direct award options,
the "alternative means" referred to in the Act is characterized
as

a

state-developed

program

which

must

meet

certain

basic

requirements, while the actual form and operation of the program
is left to the discretion of the state.
The "alternative means" term is first found in §2632(a)
in the context that, if the state adopts an "alternative means
for assuring representation of electric customers/1 the utility
is relieved of the responsibility to provide compensation for
consumer

intervention.

(Emphasis

added.)

The

"alternative

means" is further defined in the next subsection of the Act as:
" an alternative means for providing

adequate compensation to

persons" who, " (1) have or represent an interest - (A) which
would not otherwise be adequately represented and, (B) representation of which is necessary for a fair determination in the
proceeding" §2632 (b) (1) (A) and (B).

- 8 -

(Emphasis added.)

These two requirements are confirmed by the legislative
history, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1750, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong, and Ad. News, 7797, 7816-7:
...The purpose of this section is to prcvide
a mechanism to assure that the interests of
electric consumers will be represented at the
State level in proceedings dealing with
standards set forth in Subtitle B.
The
mechanism chosen for this purpose is either
of two options. One makes the utility liable
to provide compensation directly to electric
consumers who substantially contribute to the
approval in whole or in part, of a position
advocated by the consumer in a proceeding
concerning the utility relating to any
standard set forth in this title by creating
a right of action against the utility. The
second option provides that a State or State
regulatory authority or non-regulated utility
may have a program to otherwise provide
adequate compensation to persons described in
Subsection (b) . Such a program may include
an adequately funded office of public counsel
which adequately represents the interests of
persons described in paragraphs (1) and (2)
of Subsection (b). (Emphasis added.)
The Report makes it very clear that a state providing
an "alternative means" program must include intervenor funding as
part of the program.

This section of the report refers first to

the state-provided adequate compensation to persons described in
Subsection (b). It then adds that such a program of compensation
might include an office of public counsel which, as part of its
responsibility, represents the interests of the public generally
or a particular class of consumers specifically, provided that
the agency also encouraged otherwise unrepresented consumers to
participate in PURPA proceedings and compensated those eligible
for the reasonable costs of their participation.

- 9 -

The

best

analysis

of

the

requirements

of

an

"alternative means" program was made by the California Public
Utilities Commission in

Re Costs of Participation in Electric

Ratemaking Proceedings, 37 PUR 4th 259, 264 (Cal. P.U.C. 1980).
California

found

that

no

existing

state

office, including the Attorney General and in particular its own
staff, offered an "alternative means" program for two fundamental
reasons.

First, while a state agency or utility commission

staff could advocate for the public interest broadly defined, it
could

not

interests.

always

adequately

represent

specific

consumer

Second, the range of interests in any given hearing

could not be represented by one office alone.

The Commission

stated:
The Commission cannot, however, say that in
all cases the staff will adequately represent
the persons described in Section 122(b)
[2632 (b)].
As noted above, the staff is
charged with representing the broad public
interest. Often, this will be a compromise
of many interests, including those of the
utility. The staff may conclude that the
public interest is not the same as the
interests of those consumers described in
Section 122(b).
Further, there are many
differing
and
often
competing
consumer
interests in any proceeding considering PURPA
issues. Any staff would be hard pressed to
represent all of these interests.
(Emphasis added.)
In Utah the Division

of Public

Utilities, whose

duties are

spelled out in Utah Code Ann. §54-4a-l et. seq. , like the staff of
the

California

Commission,

is

charged

- 10 -

with

promoting

many

competing interests, including maintaining the financial health
of

the

utilities.

interests.

It

certainly

cannot

represent

consumer

Nor can the Commission's own small staff.

The Alaska Public Utility Commission also decided to
order direct awards of intervenor funding in PURPA proceedings.
In Re Procedure for Compensation of Electric Consumers, 38 PUR
4th 127, 132 (1980).

That Commission first concluded that the

federal act required that any "alternative means" program must
include a means for adequately compensating consumer intervenors,
and a state law department (either the Attorney General or the
Utility Commission) is a deficient "alternative means" program
because

its

necessarily

representation

of

the

public

identical to that of an

interest

individual

is

not

or class of

consumers.
This is the key to understanding why the existence of
the Committee of Consumer Services, established by statute at
Utah

Code

Ann.

§54-10-1

et

seq.

to

represent

residential

consumers and small commercial enterprises, is not an alternative
means in this case.
other

part

of

state

First, it is not authorized, nor is any
government,

to

award

compensation

to

consumers for participation in utility cases and thus fails to
meet one prong of the test.

In addition, its counsel in this

case, James Barker, described several restrictions on the actual
operation of the Committee of Consumer Services which preclude
its being the "alternative means" here:

- 11 -

the Committee is not

adequately funded

(R. 167-8); sometimes conflicts of interest

between segments of the population the Committee is authorized to
represent preclude effective representation of all interests (R.
172);

and

the position

advocated

by

Plaintiffs

here

seemed

inconsistent with Committee policy in this case (R. 175).
addition, the

Committee's

participation

passive and cannot be considered
low-income

and

senior

citizen

In

in this hearing was

"adequate representation" of
intervenors.

For

all

these

reasons, the Committee's existence should not bar the award of
fees.
The only case which squarely addresses the "alternative
means" question is POWER v. Washington Water Power Co,, 662 P. 2d
374

(Wash. 1983).

Supreme Court held

In that case a sharply divided Washington
5-4

that

the minimal participation

in a

utility rate case by a special assistant attorney general who
merely assisted members of the public in testifying precluded the
award of PURPA fees to a consumer group who actively participated
in the same case.

The majority held that since the assistant

attorney general was 1) independent of the regulatory authority;
2) empowered to appear and participate in any regulatory or
judicial proceeding; 3) authorized to retain outside experts and
4)

authorized

to

hire

and

retain

sufficient

staff,

the

requirements for PURPA1s "alternative means" were met.
The

dissenters

discussed

the

question

of

adequate

representation and concluded that the focus should be on the

- 12 -

actual authority to hire experts and staff and whether this was
done.

Since in that specific case there was no such authority,

they would have awarded compensation.
Public policy in Utah should not require consumers who
successfully contribute to a PURPA-related PSC decision to go
without compensation when the Committee of Consumer Services
merely appears but takes no active role in the decision or when
it does not appear at all or appears and takes a position
contrary

to other consumers.

The California

and Alaska PUC

analyses about the defects in such a system certainly apply here.
Consumers

should

be

reimbursed

unless

there

is

a

viable

alternative means which adequately represents their interest in
a particular case and provides compensation.

That simply did not

occur here.

III. PLAINTIFFS SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER
BELOW
In addition to commencing this action, Plaintiffs made
certain recommendations which were presented primarily through
the

testimony

of witness

Bill

Biggs.

In his

testimony

he

stressed (1) the need for customers' actual receipt of notice of
termination of service (Tr. 33-34) , (2) more definite regulations
controlling and making mandatory the customer option to make
deferred payments on deposits (Tr. 32) and delinquent accounts
(Tr. 35-36) , and (3) mandatory notification of termination to the

- 13 -

occupant of a residence where the occupant is not the account
holder (Tr. 39-40).

All of this testimony pertained to the PURPA

standard on termination of service, 16 U.S.C. §§2623(b)(4) and
2625(g).
Significant changes occurred in both Rule 5 (Deferred
Payment Agreement) and Rule 6 (Termination) of the Utah Public
Service

Commission's

recommendations.

Rules

First,

as

the

a

result

provision

of

Plaintiffs'

a

third-party

for

designee to receive notification of termination at the request of
the account holder was made available to all residential users,
Rule

6(f)(3).

Second,

the

regulations

now

include

the

requirements of a "good faith effort" on the part of the utility
to notify the account holder or an adult member of the household
within

48

hours

of

the

scheduled

termination.

Third,

the

deferred payment option was made a right of the customer rather
than a discretionary action of the utility,

Rule 5(a)(1).

This

deferred payment option covers not only delinquent balances, but
reconnection charges and security deposits as well, Rule 4(a)(4).
Fourth,

the

new

regulations

include

a

provision

for

the

protection of an occupant of a residence who is not the account
holder who is ill, Rule 6(c).

Finally, a provision requires

notice to the occupant of the termination of service at the
request
occurred

of

a

solely

demonstrate

landlord.

Rule

6(h).

Each

at Plaintiffs' urging, are

of

these

changes

substantial, and

the magnitude of Plaintiffs' contribution to the

proceedings.

- 14 -

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are entitled to fees for prosecuting this
case and this appeal by virtue of PURPA since they substantially
contributed

to

the

established

no

alternative

reimburse them.

decision

in

this

means

matter

to represent

and

Utah

has

consumers and

The lower court decision should be reversed.

DATED this ZV^day of

Q

, 1984.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants

By:/BRUCE
/ WPLENK
jl^
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Appellants' Brief, first class, postage prepaid,
to Robert Gordon and David Lloyd, Attorneys for Defendant, at
P. 0. Box 899, 1407 W. N. Temple, Suite 340, Salt Lake City, Utah
84110, this ^jH^

day of October, 1984.
1

U^JAC^I^
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EXHITBIT 1
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE CODIMISSIO^ OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Petition
of the SAL? LAKE COMMUNITY
ACTION PROGRAM i^ND UTAH ISSUES
for Prohibition on Winter
Termination of Gas and Electric
Utilitv Service.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASS MO. 32 - a c q -

1 /

ORDE n DE>"
G MOT Zn'y*
10 •—• V C * IT7"*'
FOR ATT^ .
ES

ISSUED:

April 11, 1984

3y the Commission:
By Motion dated Hay 23, 1933, the Salt Lake Community
Action Program and Utah Issues
Commission

to

$5,212.50.

award

("Petitioners") requested thin

attorneys1

its

This Motion, based

fees

in

on Section

the

122 of

amount

c*

the Public

Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 2632 (1979),
requested
attorney

compensation
with

Utah

for

Legal

the

efforts

Services,

of

Inc.,

3ruce
for

Plenk,

an

representing

Petitioners in the above-described case before the Public Service
Commission.
Utah

Power

and

Light Company, Mountain

Fuel

Supply

Company, and Utah Gas Service Company, three utilities that were
parties to the proceedings, opposed

the Motion for Attorneys1

Fees.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission having carefully'considered the arguments in the case and being fully advised concerning
the relevant law, issues the following Findings and Conclusions
and Order based thereon:
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

Petitioners

are

not

seeking

attorneysT fees from any gas utility company.

reimbursement

of

Their notion for

award of attorneys' fees is directed at Utah Power ar,d Light
Company and any other affected electric utility companies under
the provisions of Section 122 of PURPA.
2.

Unlike Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Utah Power and

Light Company has not been a primary opponent on the request for
a moratorium on winter termination of gas and electric utility
service and this Commission is unwilling to require that Utah
Power and Light pay the attorneys1 fees sought.
3.

There exists an alternative mechanism for obtaining

the attorneys1

fees sought herein by Petitioners

through the

District Court.
Based

upon

the

foregoing, the Commission

makes

the

following
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Motion
for Attorneys1 Fees requested by the Salt Lake Community Action
Program and Utah Issues and Mr. Plenk, as their attorney, be and
is hereby denied.
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day of April,
1984.

I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairran
(SEAL*

I si David R. Irvine, Commissioner
I si James M. Byrne, Commissioner

Attest:
I si Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary

